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Abstract
The disruptive technology of blockchain can deliver secure solutions without
the need for a central authority. In blockchain protocols, assets that belong
to a participant are controlled through the private key of an asymmetric
key pair that is owned by the participant. Although, this lets blockchain
network participants to have sovereignty on their assets, it comes with the
responsibility of managing their own keys. Currently, there exists two major
bottlenecks in managing keys; a) users don’t have an efficient and secure way
to store their keys, b) no efficient recovery mechanism exists in case the keys
are lost. In this study, we propose secure methods to efficiently store and
recover keys. For the first, we introduce an efficient encryption mechanism
to securely encrypt and decrypt the private key using the owner’s biometric
signature. For the later, we introduce an efficient recovery mechanism using
biometrics and secret sharing scheme. By applying the proposed key encryp-
tion and recovery mechanism, asset owners are able to securely store their
keys on their devices and recover the keys in case they are lost.
Keywords: Distributed ledger technology, Blockchain, Cryptography, Key
encryption, Biometric encryption, Key recovery
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1. Introduction
In a blockchain network, trust is embedded in the network itself. There-
fore, blockchain reduces the cost of “trust” by eliminating the third parties
traditionally needed for providing trust. This is achieved through the cryp-
tographic linking structure of the blocks, distribution of the ledger and a
consensus algorithm. Many initiatives exist aiming to replace centralized
solutions with blockchain based distributed solutions. As a result, when cen-
tralized authorities are removed as the provider of “trust”, individuals have
more sovereignty on their assets while cost associated with trust is reduced.
However this imposes more responsibility on the network participants on
managing their own keys.
Asymmetric keys play a vital role in identifying network participants and
controlling the assets in a blockchain network. An asymmetric key pair con-
sists of a public key which can be shared with anyone and a corresponding
private key which must be stored hidden. In blockchain protocols, an asym-
metric key pair is assigned to a network participant, and participants are
identified by the public key of the asymmetric key pair, while asset owner-
ships and transfers are managed through self-controlling of the private key.
Despite the ever-growing adoption of the blockchain technology, major
problems persist in storing and recovering private keys that have a negative
impact on usability of the blockchain technology, and the security of assets in
the network. Traditional private key storing mechanism includes key mem-
orization, cold storage, keeping the key digitally in plain form, keeping the
key remotely through a wallet provider, and keeping the key in a symmet-
rically encrypted digital wallet. Memorization is challenging as the private
keys are too long for humans to memorize. For instance, in Bitcoin system,
private keys’ length are 256 bits in hexadecimal which can be represented
in 64 characters in the range 0-9 or A-F. Cold storage is as secure as the
physical material where the private key is stored on, and has inefficiencies in
terms of usability as the key retrieval is challenging from the cold storage.
While digital key keeping in plain form has more usability, it is the least
secure option as the digital devices could be open and susceptible to hacking
and security breaches.
Wallets are usually responsible for the process of private and public key
pair creation. In web wallet services, private keys that belong to the clients
are encrypted and stored on related servers. Web wallets allow users to con-
trol their assets from any web browser or mobile platforms. Despite the us-
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ability advantages, storing the key remotely through a digital wallet provider
is a centralized solution, and is only as secure as the remote party, which is
trusted for keeping the private keys safe. In desktop wallets like Electrum
[38], each user locally keep their private key with the encryption option. Reg-
ular symmetrically encrypted digital wallets provide better security. How-
ever, the user must remember the password used in the encryption for the
key retrieval. If forgotten, it would be impossible to retrieve the private key.
This mechanism does not consider biometrics of the key owner.
As a matter of the fact, it is crucial to move away from traditional key
storage mechanisms towards a more user-friendly and secure key storage
approach, which incorporates the biometrics of the key owner along with a
distributed key recovery mechanism. This paper focuses on secure and user-
friendly storage of private keys, and private key recovery methods. The main
contributions of this study include the following:
• We provide a framework for secure encryption and decryption of private
keys using biometric fingerprints
• We propose a biometric-based distributed private key recovery mecha-
nism in blockchain.
• We review existing solutions in this domain, and described problems
persists in traditional private key storage and recovery mechanisms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes
blockchain technology, specifically concentrating the usage of keys and de-
scribes what key owners’ control by securely managing their keys, and what
is compromised if the keys are lost. In section 3, we describe our solution.
In section 4, we review the existing work in the domain, and we follow by
conclusion.
2. Blockchain Overview
World met blockchain with bitcoin which is popular for its proven solid
functionality of decentralized peer-to-peer digital asset transfer [28]. Blockchain
protocol gets its form with blocks which are chained with hashes. This
chain of blocks structure provides tamper-proofness and it doesn’t permit
any changes on historical records. On the other hand, each block consist of
transactions and some unique information about the block. In this section,
we emphasize the key points of blockchain protocols.
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Transactions are valuable data transfers in blockchain protocols. Depend-
ing on the protocol, transactions may contain various type of data including
but not limited to financial value, health data, a log record or identity in-
formation. Blocks are bundle of transactions with some block specific infor-
mation such as the number of the block, previous block’s hash, transactions’
merkle root [26], a timestamp and a nonce value.
Chained blocks include cryptographic chain mechanism which uses hash
functions. Every block has a hash output of previous block in the ledger.
Hash functions are deterministic and one way functions which always gen-
erate the same output for the same input. The function outputs are unique
for an input and do not contain any meaningful information about the in-
put. For each different input, hash functions generate a completely different
output.
Hash outputs can be assumed as abstract or fingerprint of a piece of
information. In the chain, each block header contains the hash value of the
previous block, constituting a chain of blocks. This mechanism provides
immutability of the data stored in the ledger. When data in a block changes,
the block hash also changes. Consequently, the next block’s hash output also
change in the chain. If any data changes in block a, the chain is broken after
block a.
2.1. Public and Private Keys in Blockchain
In blockchain protocols, public keys are commonly used as address, ac-
count number, id etc. Therefore, naturally it can be shared with other users
in the ecosystem. Private keys are used for signing transactions by its owner
[23]. In blockchain applications, generally elliptic curve digital signatures
(ECDSA) [16] or similar algorithms are used to create public and private
key pairs. In common, a participant’s digital value ownership means the val-
ues which can be digitally signed and used as input in transactions by the
participant.
As it’s described in Satoshi’s bitcoin white paper [28], when a client sends
a coin to another one, the owner actually does not send any asset to anyone.
Instead of sending a digital coin, the wallet reassigns an amount of coin and
disseminates the transaction to the network so that it can create and assign
new coins to the receiver. In order to reassign the coins, each transaction is
signed by transaction owner’s private key and is verified using owner’s public
key. Figure 1 shows transaction verifications in bitcoin transaction scheme.
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Figure 1: Bitcoin transaction scheme [28]
To provide a true mint based model system, transactions are declared
publicly and explicitly in public-permissionless blockchains like bitcoin.
2.1.1. What is Managed with Private Key
In financial applications such as bitcoin or ripple, users sign their trans-
actions with private keys. Each coin (asset) in a transaction has a public key
on it. Since private key is associated with public key, private key holder is
the owner of the coin. Similarly in health care projects, people manage their
sensitive health information. Distributed digital identity projects manage
sensitive identity information. In supply chain projects, participants manage
critical tracking records, and in real estate projects ownership of real estate
properties is managed.
Since various kind of assets are bound up with private keys in blockchain
projects, the safety of keys is vital. In case of key compromise, the attacker
is able to spend money or reach/share/sell sensitive information, or create
fraudulent records, or own and take the initiative of private properties. The
possibility of compromise scenarios and their potential consequences require
blockchain developers to build more secure protocols and key preservation
strategies.
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Figure 2: Simplified scheme of a blockchain transaction
2.2. Transactions in Blockchain
Transactions are basic units or atomic events of blockchain protocols.
Blockchain protocols usually have their own type of assets, which are trans-
ferred through transactions. As an example in bitcoin system, transactions
include coin transfers, while in sovrin [9], verifiable credentials and identity
management information are processed through transactions. Since transac-
tions are atomic events of blockchain applications, the ownership of trans-
action is critically important. In each transaction, depending on protocol’s
transaction architecture, there is one or more addresses as related to user
endpoint. These addresses are generally public keys of users. Public key or
its derivatives are used as address or endpoint. In blockchain applications,
personal information is never used to provide anonymity. As an example,
there must be at least two public keys in a normal bitcoin transaction to
manifest the transaction which is processed between two users.
Since there is no central authority, each user is responsible for creation of
their own transactions. A transaction is firstly created by the owner within
validation rules. This transaction is then checked by protocol’s authorized
nodes and is processed if validated.
In Figure 2, a basic transaction between two users is shown. As demon-
strated in the figure, the transaction is between 04f246181692c7ffd0... and
6
048370bfcc36bef0b6... addresses. Each address represents a real world user
without revealing any personal information. Therefore, transactions are gen-
erally transparent in blockchain protocols. When a transaction is generated,
it must also be digitally signed by its owner.
Digital signatures are mathematical techniques that verify authenticity
and ensure integrity of digital contents [33]. A valid digital signature shows
that the content is original as sent, and the sender is known. These features
basically points out authentication and integrity issues. Digital signatures
provide two benefits in blockchain protocols: everyone is able to verify trans-
action sender and sender is not able to deny the transaction. Transactions
transparency only can be handled with user anonymity and digital signa-
tures.
3. Methodology
In order to verify data authenticity or integrity, a user only needs digitally
signed data with a signature and the signer’s public key. From this point of
view, a transaction owner can just sign the transaction using its private key.
Then, other nodes in the network are able to verify the owner and integrity
of transaction by using just the public key of the sender of transaction. Thus,
public keys can be shared explicitly between users and private keys should
be kept hidden and safe.
In general, there are three different approaches for keeping security of
holding private keys for users. In the first approach, adding additional secu-
rity layer to reach the private keys stored on the device. Biometric authenti-
cation is used to open a private key. In the second approach, stored private
keys are also encrypted with the biometric data. Instead of encrypting ma-
chine holding security keys, the encryption of the private keys is performed.
In the last approach, private keys are generated by implementing biometric
data into known prominent cryptography algorithms including DES, RSA.
In this study, we use second approach for private key encryption, and we
utilize a distributed key recovery mechanism for private key recovery. The
authentication is done using biometric data based on features of fingerprint,
which is a popular authentication technique.
3.1. Encryption and Decryption of Private Keys Using Fingerprint
In blockchain protocols, assets must be related with owner’s public key
which represents the owner digitally and anonymously in DLT environment.
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Transactions must be digitally signed before it is published to the network.
As shown in Figure 3, a private key is sufficient for a user to digitally sign a
document.
Symmetric encryption and decryption is straightforward using conven-
tional symmetric encryption methods such as Data Encryption Standard
(DES), in which encryption and decryption is done using the same key. In
our approach, we use symmetric encryption to encrypt and decrypt private
keys, and we automatically generate the key used in symmetric encryption
using owner’s fingerprint. Fingerprints, as a biometric trait, is unique and
offers usability advantages over traditionally selected pass codes. However,
certain concerns regarding privacy, security, and applicability have to be dealt
with when using fingerprints.
In fingerprint recognition systems, there exists two main phases: reg-
istration and matching. Registration step includes registering the original
fingerprint image, while matching step includes matching the candidate fin-
gerprint image against the registered image. In both phases, the fingerprint
image is preprocessed, transformed, and hashed. Since it is probabilistically
hard for two fingerprints taken at different times to have the same hash value
(even if they match), an efficient error correction mechanism is utilized.
3.1.1. Preprocessing
Preprocessing includes image enhancement (filtering, binarization and
thinning), minutiae points extraction, core points detection, and minutiae
alignment according to the core points. Purpose of enhancement step is to
compensate for scratches and noises, and produce a binary fingerprint im-
age to accurately detect its structure. We apply Gabor filter [11] method,
in which each pixel is filtered according to estimated ridge frequency and
ridge orientation. Enhancement step is proceeded with binarization using a
threshold variable, and thinned that fixes the ridge lines width to one pixel.
The minutiae detection algorithm traverses the enhanced image to de-
tect whether a pixel represents a minutiae by checking its surrounding 8-
neighboring pixels. If the pixel is on a ridge and has 1 neighboring ridge
pixel then the pixel represents a ridge ending type of minutiae, on the other
hand, if the pixel is on a ridge and has 3 neighboring ridge pixel then the
pixel represents a bifurcation type of minutiae.
Core points’ position and orientation are needed in order to reliably align
the minutiae points with respect to these points as reference. The core points
(poincare index) of a fingerprint are special pixels that represents the centers.
8
Figure 3: Digital signature signing and verification
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Loop, delta and whorl are types of core points. We use fingerprint core
detection method suggested by Kawagoe et al. [18], which divides the image
into sub-regions, obtains direction patterns and computes core points over a
closed curve. For a pixel(x, y), it sums the difference between adjacent local
ridge orientation angles in its 8-neighborhood. Based on the result of the
calculation with a small threshold:
• (x, y) is not a core point if result is 0,
• (x, y) represents a whorl type core point if result is 2pi,
• (x, y) represents a loop type core point if result is pi, and
• (x, y) represents a delta type core point if result is −pi.
In the minutiae alignment step, each minutiae point is rotated using the
rotation of axes in two dimensions. A minutiae point (x, y) is rotated coun-
terclockwise with respect to a core point (cx, cy) with an orientation angle θ
using the matrix multiplication as below:(
x′
y′
)
=
(
cosθ sinθ
−sinθ cosθ
) (
x− cx
y − cy
)
3.1.2. Cartesian Transformation
An efficient implementation of a biometric system needs to be revocable,
since revocability is a must have feature for password systems for privacy
and security purposes. Fingerprints as a biometric signature are perma-
nently associated with the owner, and if stolen, all systems previously used
with the fingerprint signature are in danger. Therefore, we apply cartesian
transformation to transform the minutiae points using a one-way, irreversible
function to make the fingerprint system cancellable. Instead of storing the
original fingerprint image, we store the transformed version along with the
transformation parameters.
In cartesian block transformation, the 2D coordinate system on which the
minutiae points are represented is divided into blocks of regular size. Initially,
minutiae points are placed in the blocks based on their locality, such that
closer minutiae points are placed in the same or neighboring blocks. Later,
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Figure 4: Cartesian blocks transformation
the transformation is achieved by shuffling the blocks using matrix multipli-
cation, and arranging minutiae points based on the new block locations.
In our implementation, 2D coordinate system is divided into a HxW size
of blocks. Initial cartesian blocks are numbered from 1 to |HxW | which is
represented by a matrix C of size 1x|HxW |, and a transformation matrix M
of size |HxW |x|HxW | is randomly generated having values of either 0 or 1.
As an example, let H = 2 and W = 2, then C = [1, 2, 3, 4]. Then the matrix
multiplication with the randomly generated matrix of M is shown below:
C ′ =
(
1 2 3 4
) 
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
 = (3 2 4 3)
which means the minutiae points previously placed in cartesian block 1 are
mapped to 3 and 2 are mapped to 2 again. Similarly, points in cartesian
block 3 are mapped to 4, and 4 are mapped to 3 in the transformed space, as
demonstrated in figure 4. It is also possible for multiple cartesian blocks to
be mapped to the same cartesian block in the transformed space. Cartesian
blocks are numbered per their locations in the 2D coordinate system.
In the registration phase, instead of saving minutiae points’ original lo-
cations, their transformed locations are saved along with the transformation
parameters. The transformation parameters include the boundaries of the
original fingerprint image and the transformation matrix. It is important to
note that, the original cartesian block for a given minutiae point is not saved
during the registration phase. However, during matching, for candidate fin-
gerprint template, minutiae points’ original cartesian blocks are kept to be
utilized in recovery process of the reed-solomon error erasure coding.
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3.1.3. Reed-solomon Error Correction
Reed-solomon [32] is an error correction (erasure coding) mechanism. For
a given input, it produces parity data, in a way that it can reproduce original
input even if some parts are missing. Many modern storage systems, such
as Linux RAID and Facebook’s cold-storage utilize reed-solomon. Reed-
solomon breaks the message into n equal pieces and constructs an input
matrix, where n is the height of the matrix. Then, it generates a coding
matrix of size n + k, k is being the number parity rows. First n rows of
coding matrix has 1s in the diagonal and 0s for the rest of the matrix cells.
The coded data is created by multiplying the coding matrix with the origi-
nal matrix. Because of the diagonal 1s in the coding matrix, the first n rows
of the coded data is the same as the original message, and the last k rows
are parity. Thus, one row of the coding matrix generates a corresponding
row of original data. Therefore, when some rows in the original message is
missing, the corresponding rows in the coding matrix and the coded matrix
are removed, and the matrix multiplication equation with the original data
on the left side still remains valid. Later, inverse matrix of the new coding
matrix is generated, and multiplied with the each side of the new equation.
In the end, the original data matrix is produced on the left side of the equa-
tion. Figure 5 depicts an example of reed-solomon encoding of a given input
data of “ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP”, and the reed-solomon decoding when
“IJKLMNOP” is missing from the input data.
In our implementation, the hashes of the minutiae points are the input
data. We perform reed-solomon mechanism per each of the pre-transformed
cartesian blocks, having the hashes of the minutiae points as input data in-
side the blocks. By using the hashes of the minutiae points original minutiae
points of original template are never revealed, a mechanism which preserves
the privacy of the fingerprint owner. We also perform an overall reed-solomon
implementation for all of the pre-transformed rectangular, having the result-
ing hash of each cartesian block as input data. This way, the missing hashes
of the minutiae points can be recovered for each cartisian block. Conse-
quently, we are able to calculate an overall hash of the fingerprint system
that we utilize in the matching process. Overall hash is the symmetric key
to be utilized in the symmetric encryption of owner’s private key. Our goal is
to regenerate the same key for the same person during the matching phase.
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Figure 5: Example of reed-solomon encoding and decoding (adapted from [3].)
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3.1.4. Matching
In the matching phase, we follow a number of steps to determine whether
a given candidate fingerprint image produces the same overall hash value as
with the original fingerprint image. The candidate fingerprint image goes
through the same preprocessing and transformation steps as the original fin-
gerprint image, as described in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. In the cartesian
transformation, the same transformation parameters (boundaries and trans-
formation matrix) are used as in the registration of the original fingerprint
image. Moreover, in contrast to the registration phase, the original pre-
transformed cartesian block numbers are kept for the candidate fingerprint
image.
The matching algorithm compares the transformed minutiae points of
candidate fingerprint template with the transformed minutiae points of orig-
inal fingerprint template. The comparison is done separately for each of
the cartesian blocks. Geometrically closer minutiae points would be trans-
formed to the same cartesian block in both original and candidate finger-
print template. Therefore, the minutiae points in cartesian block number x
in the transformed candidate fingerprint template are only compared with
the minutiae points in cartesian block number x in the transformed original
fingerprint template. The comparison is done using the equality check of the
minutiae point types, and the euclidean distance with a reasonable thresh-
old. If a match found, the original cartesian block number of the minutiae
point that belongs to the candidate fingerprint template is used to reverse the
transformation of the minutiae point that belong to the original fingerprint
template. In this way, the original minutiae locations are recovered for the
matched minutiae points.
The recovered minutiae points for each of the cartesian blocks are gone
into the reed-solomon decoding process as explained in section 3.1.3, and a
resulting hash is generated. If the generated hash is the same as the hash
generated in the registration phase, then the fingerprint images match. Using
this hash value and the same symmetric algorithm used in the encryption,
encrypted private key is decrypted. Implementation code described in our
methodology is available for research purposes 2.
2http://bit.ly/cancellable-fingerprint-encryption
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Figure 6: Distributed Key Recovery Example
3.2. Private Key Recovery
Cryptography in blockchain protocols is heavily based on public and pri-
vate key pairs. Since public key is open to public, key recovery in distributed
ledger technology generally implies private key recovery. Private key theft
and losses are major security problems in blockchain systems. In other words,
compromise of private key leads to losing ownership of the assets associated
with the private key. Therefore, the recovery of private keys is of utmost
importance in blockchain based systems. To provide an efficient, secure and
scalable key recovery in blockchain, we propose a distributed key recovery
mechanism for encrypted private keys based on Shamir’s Secret Sharing (SSS)
Scheme [35].
The distributed key recovery mechanism of our approach is illustrated
using an example in Figure 6. In the figure, a passphrase is encrypted using
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biometrics. The encrypted text is divided into 6 pieces and distributed to 6
parties called stewards. Thus, to recover the original passphrase, the pieces
must be collected from stewards and it should be decrypted using biometrics.
In this approach, biometrics provides an extra layer of security. However,
it requires for all stewards to be available in order to retrieve the original
passphrase. In order to tackle this problem, we use Shamir’s Secret Sharing
Schema which add more flexibility for recovery.
3.2.1. Recovery using Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme
According to SSS Scheme, data D is divided into n pieces, and k pieces
of D can reconstruct D, but even k − 1 pieces reveals no information about
D [35]. By using this method, owners can divide their secret into n pieces
and distribute them to n different location. Even if some pieces are lost, any
k pieces will be sufficient to recover the secret. SSS can be applied to recover
a private key. In distributed digital identity systems, there are actors named
as stewards who are trusted nodes in the network. Stewards’ services can be
used as distributed pieces’ locations.
In our approach, biometric information is used to protect a private key
by encrypting it. We first create a symmetric key utilizing fingerprint data of
the owner, and we encrypt the private key with the symmetric key as detailed
in section 3.1. After the encryption process, the encrypted output is split
into n pieces, and each of the pieces is distributed to different and secure
locations such as steward services. For recovery, any k parts of n encrypted
pieces are sufficient to recover the private key. Once the encrypted private
key is recovered, the same symmetric key is regenerated using fingerprint and
used to decrypt the encrypted private key. In Figure 7, the overview of our
proposed private key recovery mechanism are illustrated in details.
Our key recovery is based on two main principles: encryption with bio-
metrics and distribution. Since each encrypted biometric hash and private
key pair is distributed to a set of stewards for secure storage, even when a
steward node in the blockchain network is intruded, the data stored in the
node would not be sufficient to decrypt private key. Because the attackers
would not know the locations of other stewards to complete the entire hash
key. Furthermore, despite the possibility of having accessed to all steward
nodes containing the combined hash value, the private key could not be de-
crypted without user’s biometric information which is kept in user’s local
device. In other words, there are two separate factors of security.
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Figure 7: Proposed Key Recovery Mechanism
4. Related Work
Selecting appropriate biometric data to create key pairs is another issue
that must be considered. Researchers have investigated several biometric
features in biometric-based cryptographic key generations [13].
There are very few studies that integrate biometric traits into RSA keys.
In the study, Je-Gyeong proposed a method for generating keys of digital
signature (public and private key) from biometric. Some others investigated
iris texture as a biometric feature for generating cryptographic key. Rathgeb
and Andreas proposed an approach using bits of the iris code for deriving
biometric cryptographic key [31]. Janbandhu et al. derives signature keys
from the code generated by using the 512 byte iris biometric data invented by
J. Daugman [15]. Similarly in another study, Boyen et al. also investigated
the iris texture as biometric trait [5]. In the study by Sarkar et al., biometric
authentication was used for obtaining asymmetric cryptography keys [34].
Monrose et al. proposed a method using users’ voice as biometric trait
[27]. Their system regenerates the key from the user’s voice by asking the
user to repeat the same pass phrase. In the study by Chen and Chandran,
the image of user’s face was used in biometric key generation [6]. The same
face image is required for regeneration of the key in the future.
From a different perspective, Perera et al. offered a new technique that
combines digital signature with public key cryptography [29]. This new tech-
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nique was implemented for RSA and ECC algorithms. In another study, the
proposed algorithm was developed utilizing inner productions computation
with error correction mechanism [21].
Mjaaland et al. suggested an approach in which public keys are extracted
from users’ fingerprints [Gligoroski and Knapskog]. Another fingerprint that
belong to the same user is processed to generate the private keys. The method
is resilient to the variations in the samples to generate the same resulting key.
Trotter proposed a fingerprint matching approach utilizing cartesian block
transformation with reed-solomon erasure coding [37]. In the study, reed-
solomon algorithm is performed on the entire original fingerprint template.
Also, in the reed-solomon decoding process exact locations of the original
minutiae points are recovered in contrast to our system, in which we only
recover the hash of the original minutiae points.
In a related study, Kwon et al. also proposed a digital signature based on
biometric data without holding them in hardware devices [20]. Studies that
are done on biometric creation were underway many years due to the difficul-
ties in achieving the uniformity of the biometric data from the noise. In the
study [1], the authors process biometric image first to provide the uniformity
of the unstable biometric traits. In biometric cryptosystems, images of the
biometric traits are taken and preprocessed. Then, using the preprocessed
image, minutiae of the biometric are extracted. Later, the image minutiae
points are transformed into a 1024 prime number generator to generate 2048
cryptographic key used in RSA chipper algorithm.
Kayva et al. claimed that if the face recognition system for biometric af-
firmation is considered, then AES gives more sublime security than RSA and
DES [17]. To avoid problems from occurring due to the certification authori-
ties, identity based public key cryptography and certificate-less PKI was also
proposed [22]. The communication phase between two peers has two phases.
In the first phase (initialization phase), users produce public keys from bio-
metric data. In the second phase (authentication and key agreement), they
authenticates identities. Due to the nature of the blockchain, there are no
authorities to keep the certification.
Security and privacy are major concerns in biometric-based cryptography.
Due to irrevocable nature of biometric traits, these systems must provide re-
vocability [36]. As biometric data are inherent, they cannot be changed if
compromised. Thus, in order to satisfy revocability of a generated key, bio-
metric data must not be directly associated with the biometric properties. As
shown in Figure 8, Ratha et al. proposed a fingerprint image surface folding
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Figure 8: Fingerprint image surface folding transformation [30]
transformation approach that extract minutiae positions from fingerprint im-
age and generates cancelable biometric templates. Since biometric templates
are transformed, even when the data compromised, the original biometric
data cannot cross-matched with biometric databases. Similarly, Barman et
al. offered an approach using session-based biometric keys, meaning that
another unique key should be generated in a new session using the same
biometric data [2].
In some studies, researchers explored applying more than one biometric
traits instead of using only one biometric trait. Jagadeesan et al. proposed
multimodal biometric system that generates a 256-bit secure cryptographic
key using a combination of features from iris texture and minutiae points
from the user’s finger prints [13]. In the study of Manjunath et al., they
propose multimodal approach of biometric. For instance they use iris and
fingerprint, speech and signature, face and voice etc. In the study, iris and
fingerprint modalities are used and evaluated under FAR, FRR and accuracy
[25]. Also, the study conducted by Yik-Herng proposes multi modal biometric
systems that combine iris and fingerprint with IFO hash fusion method [19].
Iris trait is unique for each individual even for identical twins. Also, false
acceptance rate (FAR), the rate of invalid matches, is lower than all other
biometric traits like fingerprint and face. Voice trait is a composite of both
behavioral and physical biometrics. Behavioral part differentiates in time
due to the factors like medical conditions and age. In contrast to token or
password-based systems, biometric matching does not work well every time
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due to the false matching or false mismatching.
Bhattacharyya et al. provided a review on biometric authentication tech-
nologies [4]. They found that fingerprint based systems had 2% FAR and 2%
false reject rate (FRR). On the other hand, face recognition system resulted
in 1% FAR and 10% FRR. According to their study, iris technologies achieved
the best accuracy score in both FAR and FRR with 0.94% and 0.99%, re-
spectively. Similarly, when comparing the biometric traits, Deborah et al.
stated that iris recognition is the most suitable for mobile locking followed
by fingerprint and face biometric data [12]. The results of the study of Yik-
Herng et al.showed that although the proposed method yields better results
than unimodal fingerprint biometric system, it does not perform as well as
iris recognition system [25]. However, the proposed method contributes to
the security aspect.
The study by Naser et al. also stated that indexing structure of iris
surpass indexing structure of fingerprint. According to their study, the hit
rate was improved from 97.0% up to 99.8% in multi-modal approach, and
98.3% respectively for fingerprint and indexing [8]. Based on the previous
research, it appears that the iris biometric system performs slightly better in
terms of accuracy when compared to the other biometric systems, in which
the fingerprint comes closest the most. Since asymmetric encryption (public
key cryptography) is a newer and more secure technique than symmetric
encryption methods, asymmetric encryption techniques are used in our study.
Smart card based biometric user authentication schemes have also been
proposed [7]. The biometric data and keys are stored in a smart card for
regeneration of keys in the future. However, smart card based approaches
have portability issues as carrying physical card is an additional burden. Also
if compromised, they pose security threats for biometric data. Fingerprint
technology provides very accurate results [30]. Also, Jain et al. claimed
that no biometric data is better than the other traits because all have own
strengths and weaknesses, and performance of biometric data selection re-
lated with the type of application [14]. However, the matching accuracy of
the fingerprint has been shown to be very high [24].
5. Conclusion
Through blockchain implementations, the hegemony of central authorities
is reduced. While this is positive for reducing the cost of providing “trust”
in the system, it increases the responsibility of the network participants on
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managing their keys. In blockchain, valuable data are locked to the public
key of the owner, and can only be unlocked for spending with associated
private key (asymmetric cryptography.) In this study, we focused on laying
a foundation for securely encrypting and decrypting private keys used in con-
trolling asset ownership in the blockchain using a symmetric key generated
from owner’s fingerprint, and a distributed private key recovery system uti-
lizing secret sharing scheme supported by biometric. We reviewed existing
solutions in this domain, and described problems persists in traditional pri-
vate key storage and recovery mechanisms in terms of security, usability and
privacy. Our methodology includes the concepts of revocable fingerprints and
erasure codes for key encryption, and distributed secret sharing scheme for
key recovery. As for future work, we aim to integrate the proposed solution
on mobile applications with white-box cryptography.
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